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Abstract: The purpose of this paper is to examine how the demand for 
independent audits and the German accounting profession evolved 
from the late 1800s to the early 1930s despite the absence of competi-
tive market forces. The paper posits that cultural ideologies, specifi-
cally with respect to nationalism, paternalism and anti-individualism, 
provide reasons for the unique configuration of not only the German 
corporate/banking structures responsible for originating financial re-
ports but the accounting profession that audited them. As the Ger-
man accounting profession was in an embryonic stage, it was not 
capable of successfully confronting the corporate/banking alliance to 
significantly impact financial reporting or the demand for audits. 
Economic crises served as the dominant pressure for business reform 
and legislation mandating audits in Germany. 
In 1931, a Presidential Decree and the ensuing Company 
Law mandated annual audits for large public firms in Germany 
(Aktienqesellschaften, or AGs), and gave government sanction to 
the German accounting profession.1 Perhaps due to their impor-
tance for the national economic good, the AGs were the only 
non-service companies subject to mandatory audits. The limited 
liability companies (Gesellschaften mit heschränkter Haftung or 
GmbHs), and the sole proprietor operations escaped the effects 
of the new Company Law. Tax law, however, regulated the ac-
counting of these latter two entities [Düring, 1939; Beuck, 
1939]. 
Although the German legislature had made numerous at-
tempts to amend the Company Law as early as 1926, Stock-
1The 1931 Company Law not only changed the accounting profession but 
also further regulated financial reporting by specifying classification formats 
and valuation techniques for balance sheet and profit and loss accounts. The 
1931 Commercial Code also contained regulations related to the general share-
holders meeting and to management's responsibility for annual reports [Voss, 
1933]. 
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company and bank failures precipitated the emergency Presi-
dential Decree and rapid enactment of the revised Company 
Law [Grossmann, 1930; Düring, 1939; Abel, 1967]. The draft of 
the 1931 Company Law cited the recent collapse of various en-
terprises, including the second largest insurance company 
FAVAG, to illustrate the need for mandatory audits [Dykxhoorn 
and Sinning, 1989a]. Semler [1939] argued that the new law 
was a direct effort on the part of the government to prevent 
future company failures. 
From World War I (WWI) to the 1930s, the German govern-
ment struggled with critical national economic problems such 
as r epa ra t i on paymen t s and Kapitalnot [Schmidt , 1934]. 
Kapitalnot refers to the shortage of capital that followed WWI as 
a result of reparation payments to the victorious Allies, German 
investment in tangible goods to fight hyperinflation, and the 
importation of foodstuffs and raw materials. A disconcerted 
public placed pressure on the legislature for economic reorgani-
zation that redefined auditor accountability and provided the 
framework for the reform of accounting and auditing standards 
[Dür ing, 1939; Semler , 1939; Stolper , 1940; Abel, 1967; 
Dykxhoorn and Sinning, 1989a]. 
Several explanations exist for the emergence of audits and 
an accounting profession to provide auditing services. Wallace 
[1985] and DeAngelo [1981] depict audits as a commodity, sub-
ject to the same laws of supply and demand as any other com-
modity in an unregulated competitive market. They suggest that 
audits serve as a monitoring device for outside stockholders to 
deter management stealth and management decisions contrary 
to owners' interests.2 Audits possess value because they provide 
a means to improve the quality of financial statements for both 
investors and management, thereby enhancing user confidence 
in the audited information. Both authors argue against the need 
for mandatory audits, stating that government regulation may 
be inefficient since private mechanisms of contracting and pric-
ing may serve to supply society's informational needs.3 If audits 
2See Jensen and Meckling [1976] for a discussion on the demand for audits 
as a monitoring device. 
3Authors such as Previts and Merino [1979] offer evidence that private mar-
ket mechanisms do not provide a sufficient supply of financial information to 
investors. A corporate philosophy that equates secrecy to success, such as that 
found in the Ivar Kreuger case [Flesher and Flesher, 1986], suggests that the 
business sector may withhold information requisite for investor decisions. 
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possess value in unregulated markets, as Wallace [1985] and 
DeAngelo [1981] suggest, then such markets also require an ac-
counting profession to provide the audit services. 
Germany's financial markets lacked a strong competitive at-
mosphere and did not exhibit a compelling demand for inde-
pendent audits during the first three decades of the twentieth 
century. Harmony among the German corporate, banking and 
government interests and lack of widespread ownership served 
to diminish the need for monitoring and external access to in-
f o r m a t i o n [Abel, 1971; Dykxhoorn and S inn ing , 1989a; 
Gallhofer and Haslam, 1991]. Thus, audit demand does not ap-
pear to provide a strong basis for the emergence of the German 
accounting profession. 
Theories drawn from the sociology of professions literature 
offer arguments other than audit demand for the emergence of 
an accounting profession. During the 1960s, sociologists began 
to take a new approach that viewed professions as political 
groups which can influence economics, markets, the state and 
class systems [Freidson, 1986]. Some sociologists posit that 
members of occupational groups employ specialized knowledge, 
credentialism and closure to establish professions that exter-
nally delineate their disciplines from other occupations [Larson, 
1977].4 If a profession can control the educational requirements 
and admission to its field, it can optimize its position of power 
in the market by controlling the supply of labor. 
Freidson [1986, p. 35] warns that the term profession must 
be employed as "a historically and nationally specific 'folk con-
cept'." He claims that professions only arise in industrial coun-
tries influenced by Anglo-American institutions.5 After the ar-
rival of industrialization in England and the U.S., strong mar-
ket economies, decentralized passive governments and laissez 
faire attitudes enabled successful occupations to achieve mo-
nopolistic professional power in competitive, unregulated mar-
kets. 
4Freidson [1986] describes credentials as items that provide information 
regarding the ability of a worker. Examples are diplomas, professional certifica-
tion, licenses and personal testimonials. Closure refers to the ability of a profes-
sion to exclude unwanted outsiders in order to achieve marke t control 
[MacDonald, 1985]. 
5Individuals entering the preindustrial professions of law, medicine and reli-
gion achieved status through attending respected universities and through elitist 
stations acquired by birth [Freidson, 1986]. 
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These conditions, Freidson [1986] argues, did not exist in 
industrialized continental Europe where occupations did not 
have to campaign for status. The middle class achieved status 
through education at elite, state sponsored educational institu-
tions [Freidson, 1986]. Graduates often obtained positions in 
civil service organizations or technical jobs in large cartels. Bu-
reaucratic entities, not market position, offered occupational se-
curity and protection. Freidson's analysis suggests that account-
ing professions only emerge in conjunction with competitive 
market forces and would not appear under a bureaucratic gov-
ernment and communal ideology such as that found in Ger-
many. 
The arguments of Wallace [1985], DeAngelo [1981] and 
Freidson [1986] pose the question: 
Does only one form of economic system, i.e., competi-
tive markets, generate a demand for independent audits 
and an accounting profession? 
Abercrombie et al. [1986] provide evidence that may explain 
how audits and the German accounting profession existed in 
the absence of competitive market forces. They submit that 
capitalism can surface under diverse ideologies and suggest that 
these ideologies affect the way capitalism is implemented. Thus, 
the form of capitalism found in a given country usually reflects 
the dominant ideology in that country. Using Japan as an ex-
ample, Abercrombie et al. [1986] illustrate how cooperative 
capitalism can co-exist with the societal attributes of national-
ism, paternalism and anti-individualism that stress collective re-
sponsibility rather than individual competitive effort. 
Abel [1971] offers an additional explanation for the emer-
gence of the German accounting profession. He argues that 
throughout the history of Germany, economic collapses, not the 
evolution of accounting theory, have been the chief motivating 
factor for Company Law adjustments. Economic crises, not 
competitive market forces, may have been the motivation in the 
demand for external audits. This study suggests that the univer-
sal concepts of nationalism, paternalism and anti-individualism, 
found in Abercrombie et al. [1986], provide contextual richness 
for understanding how economic events are reflected in the 
structural evolution of institutions such as the corporate/bank-
ing alliance in Germany, and in turn, the accounting profession. 
The analysis attempts to understand how political, economic 
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and social conditions impacted the emergence of the accounting 
profession in Germany despite the lack of competitive market 
forces to demand audits. 
Awareness of the interaction among political, social and 
economic forces may assist in the current effort towards harmo-
nizat ion of account ing s tandards . Dykxhoorn and Sinning 
[1989b] note that Germany delayed adoption of the European 
Economic Community (EEC) Fourth Directive for seven years. 
The intention of the Directive was to harmonize accounting 
practice within the EEC. One means of European harmoniza-
tion was the extension of mandatory audits to limited liability 
companies. The authors state that the Directive, rather than 
promoting unanimity, fostered discord within the German ac-
counting profession. Sensitivity to the ideological history of the 
German accounting profession may have provided insight into 
conflicts over EEC directives and the resistance of the German 
accounting community to accounting and auditing harmoniza-
tion. 
This paper first defines the analytic narrative methodology 
[Porter, 1981] that the analysis employs to examine the emer-
gence of the German accounting profession. Next, the paper 
discusses the ideologies of nationalism, paternalism and anti-
individualism and explains how these three concepts influenced 
German institutions. Included in this discussion is an analysis 
of the impact of the corporate/banking alliance on accounting 
practice and the evolution of the accounting profession. The 
study then traces the evolution of the German accounting pro-
fession from the nineteenth century, but focuses on its develop-
ment during the first three decades of the 1900s.6 The analysis 
ends with the economic crises of the 1930s, the accompanying 
federal legislation mandating audits and the establishment of 
the new professional accountant, the Wirtschaftsprüfer (WP). 
Wirtschaftsprüfer can be translated literally as economic exam-
iner [Summary, 1939, p. 96]. These accountants are licensed 
statutorily much as Certified Public Accountants (CPAs) in the 
United States (U.S.) today. The analysis concludes that despite 
an environment of cooperative capitalism, a demand for inde-
pendent audits evolved. Economic crises provided the need for 
6As most early accountants also performed auditing duties, this study uses 
the term practitioner in a universal sense that includes accountants and auditors 
without attempting to differentiate between the two roles. The paper does not 
include an examination of managerial accounting. 
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business and accounting reform, while Germany's ideological 
interpretation of the universals of nationalism, paternalism and 
individualism structured the accounting profession in a cultur-
ally unique way. 
METHODOLOGY 
The study employs the l i terature from Porter 's [1981] 
theory of emergence to trace the evolution of the German ac-
counting profession and its interaction with the socioeconomic 
factors of the period. Emergence refers to the "process of orga-
nization through which each entity becomes temporarily and 
spatially connected with its antecedent world" [Porter, 1981, p. 
74]. Porter [1981] explains that the historical event consists of a 
unique pattern of emergence where each event singularly inter-
acts with antecedent conditions by culling specific attributes 
which pertain solely to itself. Porter's [1981] methodology con-
sists of an analytic narrative designed to focus on the chrono-
logical pattern of similar occurrences followed by a backward 
contrasting between subsequent and prior events to analyze 
t h e i r a s s o c i a t i o n . The r e t r o s p e c t i v e p r o c e s s h i g h l i g h t s 
d iscont inui t ies , or unexpected re la t ionships , tha t may be 
marked by the initial sequential analysis. 
The first step in an analytic narrative is to identify a phe-
nomenon of interest which in this study is the emergence of 
legislation mandating audits. Then, in explaining the temporal 
sequence of an event, the researcher should examine the as-
cending hierarchical interaction of individuals, groups, institu-
tions, concepts (ideas and principles), fields (disciplines such as 
economics) and the "most abstract level of thought, universals, 
involved in a specific event's organization [Porter, 1981, p. 86]. 
This analysis treats the accounting profession as an institu-
tion that interacts with other institutions such as the corporate/ 
banking community and the national government (see Figure 
1). Three primary accounting groups: academics, book examin-
ers and audit companies, constitute the institution of the Ger-
man accounting profession during its evolutionary period in the 
first three decades of the twentieth century. Throughout the 
study, the analysis considers the interaction of these groups and 
insti tutions with concepts, such as secrecy, disclosure, and 
monitoring, socioeconomic phenomena, and lastly with the cul-
tural attributes of nationalism, paternalism and individualism, 
which it treats as universals. 
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FIGURE 1 
Porter's [1981] Ascending Hierarchy of Elements Applied to 
the Emergence of the 1931 Germany Company Law 
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THREE PREVAILING IDEOLOGIES AND THEIR IMPACT 
ON GERMAN INSTITUTIONS 
Abercrombie et al. [1986] suggest that three cultural ele-
ments: nationalism, paternalism and individualism, influence 
the form of capitalism, and other societal structures, extant in a 
nation. The analysis employs Abercrombie et al.'s [1986] ap-
proach in suggesting that the German accounting profession 
emerged in an economic and political atmosphere that reflected 
communitarian concepts rather than an ideology based on indi-
vidualism. 
Nationalism as a Characteristic of Germany 
The coexistence of nationalism with capitalism in modern 
Germany demonstrates the contradiction inherent in the evolu-
tion of German political ideology. Free-trade and social democ-
racy co-existed. During the eighteenth century, national Prus-
sian policies promoted the growth of Cameralism (Mercantil-
ism) that supported the protection of the markets from foreign 
intrusion. Cameralism, the predominant economic policy of the 
period, was synonymous with the creation of a state institution 
embodying a national economy [Schmoller, 1967]. Liberalism, 
while used to justify arguments for free trade, always remained 
shrouded in a tradition of state involvement that shielded mar-
ket positions.7 Industries and trade groups frequently looked to 
the government for protection. 
The evolution from feudalism to industrialism promoted 
the formation of joint-stock companies during the 1800s. 
Throughout the first three decades of the twentieth century, 
large German corporations maintained an interactive relation-
ship with the Reich government. The German government ac-
tively promoted consolidation, perceiving cartels as more effi-
7Liberalism in Germany referred to a policy of individual freedom, but un-
like that found in England or France. German liberalism remained cloaked in 
"the Cameralist tradition of state intervention" and a sense of community 
[Hasek, 1925, p . 90]. Industries and trade groups, economically depressed by 
unregulated competition, looked to the government for protection. The state 
frequently intervened by nationalizing particular industries, such as the railroad 
and the utilities, considered essential for the country's good. Direct government 
supervision, however, did not ensue until the banking crises of 1931 and did not 
become the norm until the advent of National Socialism [Stolper, 1940]. 
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cient than a free market.8 Turner [1985] and Gallhofer and 
Haslam [1991] suggest that cartels depended on the German 
government for financial survival; the Reich's purpose in pre-
serving the large corporations was to maintain industrial pro-
duction and employment. 
Gallhofer and Haslam [1991] conclude that the German 
government condoned conservatism and secrecy over disclosure 
to promote corporate stability. Banks became so powerful that 
they were able to compel secrecy while simultaneously earning 
the trust of the public. The public generally did not have an 
abiding faith in laissez faire economics, therefore, corporate 
concentration and secrecy did not generate vigorous criticism, 
until a time of crisis [Semler, 1938; Gallhofer and Haslam, 
1991]. 
The Impact of Paternalism 
Paternalism evolved from the Junker feudalistic perception 
of noblesse oblige [Stern, 1975]. Nobility conferred an obligation 
to behave charitably towards all people. Hegel's notion of the 
subordination of the individual to the State to promote the com-
munal good may have been an evolutionary consequence of the 
early feudal tenet of noblesse oblige. The government responded 
to the social problems of industrialization by enacting paternal-
istic social reforms such as health insurance and work-hour im-
provements in an effort to repress further labor revolt [Ullmann, 
1981; Gallhofer and Haslam, 1991]. Paternalism helped to jus-
tify establishment of a modified corporate welfare system in 
Germany. 
Executives of the large corporations also exhibited the char-
acteristic of noblesse oblige in attempts at improving worker 
welfare.9 However, Hay [1981] argues that after WWI German 
industrialists dropped social welfare as a positive tactic to pre-
vent strikes and maintain production when the social programs 
failed to increase worker efficiency and preserve peace. Despite 
the limited degree of welfare reform, an ostensible paternalistic 
attitude enabled bankers and industrialists to avoid recrimina-
8Unlike the U.S., the German government did not enact anti-trust legislation 
to foster competition. 
9See Tampke [1981] and Stolper [1940] for examples of labor welfare mea-
sures such as guaranteed fixed incomes, eight-hour work days and prohibition 
of Sunday labor for women and children. 
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tions of greed and self-interest. The State assumed that execu-
tives and cartel directorates would exercise effective paternalis-
tic control that would protect the public and promote the na-
tional good. Corporate stability would benefit all. 
The Impact of Anti-individualism 
Abercrombie et al. [1986] define three types of individual-
ism: political liberalism, economic or classical liberalism, and 
individuality or Romanticism. Political liberalism implies equal 
rights for each person. Economic liberalism, represented by a 
utilitarian laissez-faire perspective, posits that market self-regu-
lation will maximize the well being of a nation. Prussians were 
not egalitarian and classical liberalism never existed even as a 
rudimentary ideology [Stern, 1975]. The only form of individu-
alism found in Germany was that of the Romant ic which 
stressed individual genius, not individual rights.10 German indi-
vidualism accepted rigid controls through bureaucracy as long 
as society permitted freedom of thought. 
German Romantic individualism, tempered by a strong na-
tionalistic and paternalistic tradition, enjoined everyone to work 
for the communal good and led to cooperative capitalism. Coop-
erative capitalism did not provide an environment conducive to 
individual competition where professional market protection 
through the achievement of status and credentials were requi-
site to professional survival. 
The Impact of the Corporate/Banking Alliance 
On Accounting Practice 
Two major inst i tut ions, stock corpora t ions (AGs) and 
banks, interacted with the accounting profession in establishing 
accounting and audit practice. Germany's system of cooperative 
capitalism sustained a climate of anti-individualism whose laws 
supported cartels and failed to protect individual shareholders 
o r encourage widespread stock ownersh ip [Gallhofer and 
Haslam, 1991]. The Prussian Commercial Code of 1884 ostensi-
bly protected minority shareholders by furnishing the right to 
challenge accounting statements at general assembly meetings 
[Gallhofer and Haslam, 1991]. However, minority shareholders 
10For examples of thoughts on the freedom of individual genius within the 
Romantic Movement, see Schlegel [1968] and Schleiermacher [1977]. 
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rarely marshalled sufficient support to meet the Code owner-
ship percentage requirements for protests. Disclosure of finan-
cial data to protect the average investor did not become a major 
issue. Abel [1971] concludes that the primary intent of govern-
ment regulation was to protect the creditors, not the sharehold-
ers. 
Kreditbanken11 were closely linked with the AGs and served 
in the dua l roles of credi tors and majori ty s tockholders 
[Neuburger, 1977]. Their main purpose before WWI was the 
long-term capitalization of industry. Sparkassen, similar to U.S. 
savings and loan institutions, supplied credit to individuals and 
small businesses [Northrop, 1938]. Banks owned the majority of 
corporate stock, served on corporate boards, were involved with 
stock market speculation and had little concern with the inter-
ests of individual minority shareholders [Northrop, 1938; Baker, 
1970]. By 1933, only six banks controlled all financial institu-
tions. Banks had a competitive advantage. They collected all 
necessary financial information via ownership and supervisory 
board representation and through their own audit companies, 
the Treuhandgesellschaften [Abel, 1971; Gallhofer and Haslam, 
1991]. Therefore, they did not favor independent audits and full 
disclosure. 
Interlocking directorates, encouraged by the government to 
maximize the nat ions well being, provided a mutually support-
ive linkage between corporations and banks. German supervi-
sory boards, composed of management from banks and other 
stock corporations, were responsible for internal auditing, the 
presentation of reported earnings at the annual shareholders' 
mee t ing , and approval of cer ta in bus iness a r r a n g e m e n t s 
[Gallhofer and Haslam, 1991; Dykxhoorn and Sinning, 1989a].12 
The institutional structure may have precluded supervisory 
boards from being effective monitors when corporate manage-
ment was involved with fraud, embezzlement and deceptive bal-
ance sheets. Interlocking directories meant managers of one 
company served on supervisory boards of other companies. If 
11Although the main purpose of the Kreditbanken was the long-term capitali-
zation of industry, they performed a variety of functions including those of 
stock broker, underwriter, and supplier of short-term credit [Neuburger, 1977]. 
12See Dykxhoorn and Sinning [1989a] for a more detailed discussion of 
German corporate directorates. The authors translated H. Gottschalk, Die 
Lehren aus den Aktienskandalen der Nachkriegszeit, (Frankfurt, 1934) for their 
analysis. 
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the boards, who selected management, exposed fraud, then 
their judgement would have been called into question. Thus, 
directors rarely challenged management directly [Dykxhoorn 
and Sinning, 1989a]. 
Gallhofer and Haslam [1991] explain that corporate and 
banking institutions actively promoted secret reserves and con-
servatism for stability.13 Corporate management, supported by 
national protectionism, promoted conservative accounting. Nu-
merous reasons existed for creating secret reserves, i.e., the 
limitation of profit distributions to minority shareholders, pro-
tection of creditors (the Kreditbanken), independence from the 
Reichsbank credit system, and the hiding of WWI profits ob-
tained from government contract work [Gallhofer and Haslam, 
1991; Northrop, 1938; Stolper, 1940]. However, Abel [1971] as-
serts that protection of creditors remained the dominate reason 
for government permissiveness on secrecy regarding capital ac-
cumulation until World War II. Secret reserves solidified and 
amplified the position and power of one group, the banks 
(Kreditbanken). 
Voss [1933] explains that while secret reserves would pre-
clude an auditor from conferring a certificate that the accounts 
were correct, they would not prevent the examiner from con-
firming that the accounts agree with the legal requirements. 
Secret reserves ". . . are in principle allowed by the law" [Voss, 
1933, p. 532]. Gallhofer and Haslam [1991] agree that the Ger-
man government not only condoned, but encouraged secrecy to 
ensure capital accumulation as well as confidentiality. Forrester 
[1984] implies that companies still employ secret reserves in 
financial reporting, compelling analysts to adjust published Ger-
man profits upward for these surpluses.14 
The complex interrelationships between banks and AGs pre-
cluded the use of an audit as an effective monitoring device. The 
13See Gallhofer and Haslam [1991] for a discussion on how conservative 
accounting created secret reserves. See Forrester [1977] for a discussion on how 
early cameralist accounting, a type of stewardship system, also promoted con-
servatism by focusing on the preservation of feudal estate products. 
14A current edition of the Wall Street Journal [Aeppel, 1993, p . A10] provides 
evidence that German use of secret reserves continues. In a recent effort to 
become listed on the New York Stock Exchange, a German corporat ion, 
Daimler-Benz AG, stated it will declare extraordinary profit of four billion 
marks ($2.45 billion) from disclosure of secret reserves. The profit is the result 
of application of uniform asset valuation methods on the balance sheet. 
12
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failure of one institution would impact a host of related compa-
nies; thus, disclosure of fraud or ineptitude might result in a 
chain reaction that would threaten the whole economic system. 
B a n k s p e c u l a t i o n was f lagrant e n o u g h in 1927 for the 
Reichsbank to threaten credit restriction [Northrop, 1938]. The 
warning went unheeded as both corporations and banks ob-
tained foreign funding. When the foreign supply of credit ceased 
with the growth of National Socialism, economic collapse oc-
curred [Schmidt, 1934]. 
Only the failure of the corporate/banking structure to func-
tion effectively for the national good brought state intervention 
resulting in the 1931 Presidential Decree and ensuing amend-
ment to the Company Law requiring audits . The citizenry 
looked to nationalism and a planned economy for a cure to 
economic hardship. The public no longer accepted corporate/ 
banking paternalistic expertise and anti-individualism as crite-
ria to maintain the traditional situation of conservation and se-
crecy. The paper next discusses the dominan t accountant 
groups involved in the emergence of the Presidential Decree and 
the following legislation. 
GROUPS INVOLVED WITH THE 
PRESIDENTIAL DECREE OF 1931 
Following Porter's methodology, the analysis highlights the 
interaction between primary groups involved with the formation 
of the Company Law that required mandatory audits. First, this 
section identifies three main accounting groups, academics, the 
book examiners and audit companies. Then the analysis ex-
plains how the three groups interacted with the political sector 
in draf t ing the Company Law tha t es tab l i shed the new 
Wirtschaftsprüfer profession. 
The Evolution of the Book Examiners 
The auditing profession evolved through a slow and contro-
versial process. Both Dykxhoorn and Sinning (1989a) and 
Buchholz (1939a) discuss the emergence of auditors. The book 
examiner (vereidigte Bücherrevisor) originated through the Ger-
man court system as an expert witness and trustee in liquida-
t ion disputes. As with the development of Company Law, 
Prussia was the leader in accounting and auditing regulation. 
Lander (province) courts originally swore in auditors, but by 
13
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1900 the Chambers of Commerce assumed the responsibility for 
swearing in and appointing book examiners, al though they 
m a i n t a i n e d varying admis s ion cr i te r ia [van Dien, 1930; 
Gallhofer and Haslam, 1991]. 
The Prussians began regulating book auditors as Certified 
Book Examiners (CBEs) in 1926 [Dykxhoorn and Sinning, 
1989a]. An examination served as the means of certification and 
admission to practice. The Prussian Chamber of Commerce law, 
which introduced rules for the examination and admission of 
auditors, served as the regulatory body. Chambers in other 
Lander soon followed the Prussian example [Buchholz, 1939a]. 
Schourp [1930] and van Dien [1930] assert that accounting 
groups developed numerous associations to address profes-
s ional interests . 1 5 The Verband deutscher Bücherrevisoren 
(V.D.B.), representing certified (sworn-in) auditors, originated 
in 1896 and became the major accounting organization, besides 
audit and trust firms, to supply practitioners [Schourp, 1930; 
Gallhofer and Haslam, 1991; Buchholz, 1939a]. Besides requir-
ing that the applicant be certified by a chamber of commerce or 
other official authority, the V.D.B. required that the potential 
member pass an examination given either through the certifica-
tion process, the Leipzig Commerce College or by the V.D.B. 
itself [van Dien, 1930; Schourp, 1930]. 
Audit and Trust Companies 
The most powerful group of accountants that competed 
with the book examiners for control of the profession were the 
bank auditors. Bank auditors became an effective force through 
large audit and trust firms, the Treuhandgesellschaften. Banks 
first created the companies in the beginning of the twentieth 
century to obtain financial information for credit decisions and 
for monitoring the operations of their obligees. Dykxhoorn and 
Sinning [1989a] and Schourp [1930] cite as an example the 
founding by the Deutsche Bank of the Deutsche Treuhandgesell-
schaft, a public accounting firm that is still in existence today. 
Buchholz [1939a] adds that with growing industrialization 
and increasing demands for audits, joint-stock audit firms de-
15Locke [1984], however, maintains that the early German accounting pro-
fession had no powerful cohesive associations, as did the British, to regulate the 
occupation. German organizations were more like collegial brotherhoods whose 
members possessed similar occupational and educational backgrounds. 
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veloped that were independent from the banks. The book exam-
iners (vereidigte Bücherrevisoren), perhaps a remnant of German 
liberalism, urged the development of an auditing profession in-
dependent from other businesses, i.e., the banks [Dykxhoorn 
and Sinning, 1989a]. The predominant universals of protective 
nationalism and paternalism, inherent in German cooperative 
capitalism, however, supported the bank/cartel relationship and 
the existence of the bank-controlled audit firms. While van Dien 
[1930] asserts that bank influence on auditors had ended by the 
late 1920s, Forrester [1984] concludes that the banks never lost 
control, even after WWII. 
The Treuhandgesellschaften also founded an organization, 
the Verband Deutscher Treuhand-und Revisionsgesellschaften 
(V.D.T.R.), in 1919 to promote mutual interests of bank audit 
firms. By 1929, this group consisted of approximately 80 audit 
and trust firms [van Dien, 1930, p. 16]. 
The Role of German Academics in the Accounting Profession 
Academics influenced both book examiners and bank audi-
tors in molding the German accounting profession. Locke 
[1984, p. 215] concludes that academics "were the driving force 
behind the discipline." They developed accounting theory, de-
vised curricula, instructed the practitioners and were influential 
in the auditing profession. Academics joined both the V.D.B. 
and the V.D.T.R.16 
Locke [1984] concludes that in Europe the greatest profes-
sional impact on business management occurred in Germany, 
and mainly through the accounting profession. Abel [1971] 
notes that accounting was included in the discipline of business 
economics (Betriebswirtschaftslehre). Business management and 
accountants did not receive their education at universities but at 
commerce colleges, which initially taught a form of cameralist 
administration. The first commercial college was established in 
1898 at Leipzig and the second in Cologne in 1901 [Locke, 
1984]. Other colleges became established in major German cit-
ies from 1901 to 1919 [Forrester, 1977]. 
16Van Dien [1930] notes that accountants frequently belonged to more than 
one organization and that most auditors who were members in local associa-
tions also belonged to the V.D.B. These smaller organizations probably were not 
effective in instituting changes within the profession. 
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Leading professionals, such as Schmalenbach and Bünger, 
perceived of college as the means to standardize knowledge and 
to achieve status through public recognition as a technical ex-
pert [Schourp, 1930; Voss, 1930]. Schourp [1930] implied that 
practitioners who received no accounting training, except 
through apprenticeship, were considered inferior to those with 
specialized academic backgrounds. 
By 1926, standardization became legitimized when legisla-
tion instituted a uniform exam for CBEs which was graded by a 
board that consisted of at least two members of the V.D.B. [van 
Dien, 1930; Schourp, 1930].17 Although a college education was 
never a condition for admission to the profession per se, an 
aspirant practically required a college education to pass the 
exam. 
Accounting academics both exemplified and sustained Ger-
man ideology. Abercrombie et al. [1986] argue that education 
serves as a primary means of introducing and maintaining a 
dominant philosophy of a nation. Business economics, emerg-
ing from the discipline of cameralist administration in the uni-
versities, sanctioned nationalistic protectionism in industry. The 
accounting emphasis on expertise reflected German Romantic 
individualism that stressed the human intellect. The existence of 
business economics at the German colleges, in particular the 
specialized accounting program at Leipzig, and German societal 
regard for professional expertise were primary factors in en-
abling the accounting profession to be so influential in industry. 
The Influence of the Three Groups on the 1931 Decree 
Academics, book examiners and bank auditors interacted 
through conflict, then compromise, to establish the new exclu-
sive tier, the Wirtschaftsprüfer. The newly approved auditors 
were those who had a power base through the V.D.B. and the 
Treuhandgeseltschaften.18 These two groups already had demon-
strated proficiency and had a large share of the audit clients. 
While most factions of the profession united to champion 
standardized educational requirements among the Lander 
17Note that the U.S. certification exam first appeared in 1896 just prior to 
the turn of the twentieth century, but was not uniform across all states until 
1952 [Carey, 1969]. 
18Academics were also prevalent in the new profession. Government statis-
tics as of June 30, 1938, report that out of 1126 Wirtschaftsprüfer 568 (50.4%) 
were academicians [Buchholz, 1939a, p. 122]. 
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[Locke, 1984; Graves, 1987; Bünger, 1926], hostility between the 
CBEs and the bank-controlled audit companies hampered a 
consolidated effort to promote mandatory audits [Dykxhoorn 
and Sinning, 1989a]. Dykxhoorn and Sinning [1989a] explain 
tha t while the CBEs and the independent Treuhandgesell-
schaften, both desiring to expand their list of clients, supported 
mandatory audits for all stock companies, the Kreditbanken op-
posed the compulsory examinations. Bankers, who frequently 
were also shareholders and directors of major corporations, 
feared losing control of management through disclosure and 
external audits. 
By 1929, however, the V.D.B. and the bank auditors had 
compromised sufficiently to propose a bill that would merge the 
two audit groups into one profession, that of the "Public Ac-
countant and Trustee" (Revisor und Treuhänder) [van Dien, 
1930], later to become the Wirtschaftsprüfer.19 Despite the at-
tempt in the 1920s at self-regulation, van Dien [1930] and 
Grossmann [1930], recognizing professional internal conflict, 
predicted that the German legislature would never adopt the 
Bill. The drafters themselves were not completely satisfied with 
the results and many Lander still opposed a unified profession. 
Most of the admission and professional regulations, however, 
included in the newly proposed bill were the same as those 
finally instituted in the 1931 Presidential Decree. 
Although reflective of an increasing German propensity to-
wards nationalism, the 1931 Decree and ensuing legislation also 
provided evidence of professionally advocated self-regulation 
that employed federal licensing and a dual system of supervi-
sion. The law divided the responsibility for monitoring the pro-
fession between the government Chambers of Commerce and a 
new professional organization, the Institut der Wirtschaftsprüfer 
(IdW).20 The Chambers appointed Wirtschaftsprüfer and for-
warded complaints to admissions boards that investigated and 
tried cases [Voss, 1933]. Later the WP Chamber of Auditors 
(Wirtschaftsprüferkammer) became the public sector organiza-
tion responsible for oversight of and disciplinary action against 
19Van Dien [1930] notes that the original draft was in existence as early as 
1926. 
20The profession, not waiting for federal enactment, founded a national as-
sociation in 1930, the National Institute of Auditing and Trustee Work 
[Forrester, 1977 and Luck, 1984]. The national association established in 1930 
was the predecessor to the IdW. 
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members of the profession [Dykxhoorn and Sinning, 1981]. The 
IdW represented the Wirtschaftsprüfer on matters of standard 
setting, self-regulation and public accounting affairs [Voss, 
1933]. Buchholz [1939a, p. 117] referred to the IdW as the ". . . 
overall professional check." The monitoring function of the two 
organizations became practically inseparable and indiscernible. 
As Dykxhoorn and Sinning [1981] explain, the affiliation be-
tween the IdW and the Wirtschaftsprüferkammer, is extremely 
close even today. Both main offices are housed in the same 
building in Düsseldorf. 
By 1937, an amended Company Law officially ranked the 
CBEs at a middle tier, below the prestigious Wirtschaftsprüfer. 
While both groups competed for general accounting services, 
only the elite Wirtschaftsprüfer could perform the mandatory 
audits of stock corporations after implementation of the 1931 
Company Law [Buchholz, 1939a; Voss, 1933]. In 1933, the Na-
tional Socialist Federal Rights Union (NSRB) dissolved the 
V.D.B. A newly formed Institut der Wirtschaftsprüfer had re-
placed the V.D.B. as the representative organization of accoun-
tants. 
Although German accountants emphasized technical exper-
tise as a means of fostering objectivity in financial reporting, 
they lacked the organizational cohesiveness to promote unifor-
mity in accounting principles [Voss, 1933; Singer, 1943]. The 
crusade for uniform cost accounting to enhance national pro-
ductivity never carried over extensively to financial reporting 
[Abel, 1971; Singer, 1943]. Lack of widespread corporate owner-
ship and government confidence in the corporate/banking alli-
ance precluded national interest in standardization of financial 
accounting. The 1931 Company Law was generally vague re-
garding implementation of accounting principles such as "rea-
sonable" depreciation and "fair" value of assets [Voss, 1933]. 
Additionally, few auditing rules existed. Even after the 1931 
Presidential Decree establishing the WP, the profession's repre-
sentative organization, the IdW, provided little guidance on the 
issuance of audit reports or on conducting examinations [Voss, 
1933; Niehus, 1969]. 
The originally drafted bill demonstrated that, despite inter-
nal conflicts, the auditing profession, not the German govern-
ment bureaucracy, initiated professional regulation. Buchholz 
[1939b] and Schourp [1930] depicted the profession as indepen-
dent (auditors were never civil servants), but accepting of the 
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State through national regulation. Only the lack of cohesiveness 
among the book examiners and the bank auditors, and a gov-
ernment preoccupied with overwhelming economic issues had 
delayed legislation until the economic crises of the early 1930s. 
While disclosure was more defined than under previous codes, 
protectionism and conservatism were still in evidence. The Gov-
ernment still operating under a penchant for secrecy continued 
to condone secret reserves [Semler, 1938]. 
The Permeation of Nationalism, Paternalism and 
Anti-individualism in the German Accounting Profession 
German capitalism might be best described as cooperative 
capitalism. The private sector produced the goods and services 
while the State condoned consolidation to ensure economic sta-
bility and the nation's well being. Germans did not eulogize 
market competition, which they regarded as inefficient and de-
structive, engendering conflict not consensus. German national-
ism created a climate conducive to cartelization and the use of 
accounting as a tool to promote economic stability and to en-
able those who controlled cartels to accumulate capital. 
German paternalism made acceptance of cartels possible 
and industrialists' and bankers' claims, that they subordinated 
their own interests to society's, plausible. The cameralist tradi-
tion, exhibited in the commerce colleges, reflected the spirit of 
noblesse oblige. Nationalism, paternalism and Romantic indi-
vidualism enjoined Germans to work for the common good; re-
sulting in cooperative capitalism that formed an ideological 
framework under which the institutions of cartels, banks and 
the accounting profession operated. A harmony of interests be-
tween the Kreditbanken and the cartels and a lack of concern for 
individual property rights, precluded a concern for minority 
shareholders, financial disclosure, and independent monitoring. 
Education reinforced the concept of paternalism and Ro-
mantic individualism, by permitting individuals to develop their 
minds and talents to improve society through technical exper-
tise. The German accounting profession promoted expertise as 
its predominate attribute. The introduction of business econom-
ics, Betriebswirtschaftslehre, into the commercial colleges con-
tributed to the standardization of accounting education, and 
empowered the accounting profession to assume the role of "ex-
pert" in the business community. Accounting served as the tool 
to gauge efficiency. Despite emphasizing technical expertise and 
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standardized rules as goals in financial accounting, however, no 
uniform professional auditing standards existed in Germany un-
til the 1930s. 
By the 1930s, the German accounting profession was just 
beginning to emerge from a nascent state. Practitioners sought 
to gain professional status and influence through enhanced edu-
cation and federal licensing. Evolution towards professional 
maturity was exemplified by the fact that by the late 1920s, 
German accountants had drafted legislation not only mandating 
audits, but establishing an elite national profession. The lack of 
cohesiveness, however, commonly found in the early stages of 
group evolution, prevented the German profession from uniting 
to achieve legislative recognition until the economic crises of 
the 1930s. Nationalism, by then more completely entrenched in 
German politics, became evident in federal licensing and by 
1931 resulted in a unified profession under the IdW. 
CONCLUSION 
The emergence of the German accounting profession shows 
that the cultural attributes described by Abercrombie et al. 
[1986] provide explanations of political actions. The lack of 
competitive market forces per se does not imply a corresponding 
lack of demand for audits or the absence of an accounting pro-
fession. Without widespread stock ownership and a free market 
to allocate resources, monitoring of management operations 
can be provided by other methods. In the case of Germany, 
bank auditors furnished this mechanism until economic crises 
proved internal examinations suspect. 
This study concurs with Abel's [1971] conclusion that busi-
ness reforms evolve only if economic needs arise. Economic cri-
sis, not the nascent accounting profession, resulted in legislative 
action mandating audits. The emerging accounting profession 
was not capable of successfully confronting the existent corpo-
rate/banking alliance to significantly impact financial reporting 
or the demand for audits. 
The role of the German banks, not only as creditors, share-
holders and speculators, but as interlocking directors of cartels, 
meant the economic collapse of one institution, the banks, af-
fected the other, the cartels. The German government could no 
longer continue a hands-off approach. Secrecy no longer func-
tioned to maintain stability but had resulted in financial col-
lapse. Independent monitoring became mandatory to protect 
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the nation, but Germany had to look to the expertise of the 
public accounting profession for the watch-dog mechanism, 
now acquiescent towards national regulation. The economic cri-
ses of the 1930s precipitated federal legislation, but the propen-
sity in Germany to focus on communality made national control 
acceptable to the members of the accounting profession. 
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